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A Neglected Ricardian Aspect Of Labor Supply
Abstract
Consider a labor market, or closely related set of such markets, in which a labor service is sold to buyers with
differing characteristics, who combine it with other inputs to manufacture consumer's or producer's goods.
We assume (and it is a crucial assumption) the service to be tied to, or embodied in, the buyers. We refer.to the
service as an embodied labor service, to Indicate the Impossibility of resale. The question arises, how do
suppliers distribute themselves among buyers? What factors determine trading with a larger number of
demanders more extensively, as opposed to a smaller number more intensively? The problem bears a
resemblance to Rlcardo's famous analysis of the cultivation of land, here, an individual buyer represents the
Intensive margin, and the number of buyers a supplier deals with, the extensive margin, but the analogous
issue remains, whether to trade more intensively or more extensively.
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A NEGLECTED RICARDIAN ASPECT OF
LABOR SUPPLY
1. Introduction and Background to the Problem.
Consider a labor market, or closely related set of such markets, in which
a labor service is sold to buyers with differing characteristics, who combine
it with other inputs to manufacture consumer's or producer's goods. We assume
(and it is a crucial assumption) the service to be tied to, or embodied in,
the buyers. We refer.to the service as an embodied labor service, to Indicate
the Impossibility of resale. The question arises, how do suppliers distribute
themselves among buyers? What factors determine trading with a larger number of
demanders more extensively, as opposed to a smaller number more intensively?
The problem bears a resemblance to Rlcardo's famous analysis of the cultivation
of land, here, an individual buyer represents the Intensive margin, and the
number of buyers a supplier deals with, the extensive margin, but the analogous
issue remains, whether to trade more intensively or more extensively.
The question is not unrelated to topics which have been considered by
several works in the literature, but so far as is known, has not been directly
attacked. Rosen (1974) examines the matching of buyers with sellers in the context
of a general market, using the Hedonlc Hypothesis. In his model, producers can
continuously vary amounts of objectively measurable goods characteristics; they
can perfectly customize their product, and producers and consumers are continuously
distributed by these characteristics. Equilibrium in such a market is "spatial"
in character. He does not examine what I would term the intensity of this
matching process, and its probable relationship to the non—market, or second round,
production stressed by Becker (1965).^ Furthermore, once the decision to trade
^e say second round, because the remark applies equally to any production
process using a produced means as an input. Production need not be non-market
to exhibit this analytical form.
with one buyer more Intensively than another is incorporated, a kind of sorting
does emerge which does not depend on quality variations. The issue of quality
variation is important, because embodied labor markets are susceptible to price
discrimination by sellers. Since resale of the service is impossible, only collu
sion by initial suppliers is required for price discrimination to exist. This
possibility gives rise to an identification problem, since to show price dis
crimination, controls over quality variation must be established.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 consideirs the
problem in a simple case, where the service is perfectly homogeneous, and no
identification problem exists; section 3, in the spirit of Houthakker's (1952)
contribution, allows the quality of service to vary according to a single character
istic; section 4 is an extension to the case of n characteristics; section 5
indicates possible applications of the analysis and concludes the paper.
2'. The Market i^th no Quality Variation.
Since in general the production into which the embodied labor service enters
as an input may be an item of consumption, or else a producer's good, and since
the analysisi of a pure producer's good is simpler, the analysis of this section
is broken into two parts. The first part considers the case of a homogeneous
service entering into production, the outcome of which has no utility-bearing
properties. The second part relates to a mixed consumption—productive case where
output of the service is desired because it yields utility directly as well as
indirectly- through increase of wealth. Also, in view of applications later to be
proposed, in each instance let the demanders of the service be ultimate consumers
facing symmetric time and goods constraints.
A. A Pure Production Good of the Consumer
Define U as the static utility function of a consumer, Z as the goods consumed
and produced by the consumer using own consunrotlon time t and market goods
c
X, as in the (by now) familiar model of household production. Hence,
U= U(Z) =. U[Z(t^,X)3. (1)
Utility is maximized subject to a time constraint, and a goods constraint.
Define t as total time, t as time spent working, and t as residual, or "wasted"
W 17
time, whose role will shortly be explained. All uses of time must sum to total
time, or
t = t + t + t . (2)
c w r ^
On the other hand, money income'is the sum of earnings, the product of
the wage W and working time tW, plus non-earned income V. This income is spent on
market goods X priced at PX, and other items. For present purposes the other
items are the labor service, called L , and priced at P . Hence, the goods
S 8
constraint is:
t w + V = P X + P L . (3)
w X X s ^ '
Equations (2) and (3) are not independent and reduce via substitution to
tW + V = P X + P L (4)
X s -S .
The labor service enters with part of residual time into a production
function of the consumer which in general increases effective time and the wage
rate. Hence, define:
tr = tg + t^. (5)
where t^ is the cons-mer*s own time which is cooperative with L , and t is
s 1
the pure loss of time. Also define production function for the constraint-
expanding commodity S, homogeneous of degree 1,
S - S(tg, Lg). (6)
has two productive uses; on the one hand, It can decrease the pure loss of time,
expanding the amount of time available for work and consumption i on the other hand.
S could raise the wage rate and cause the consumer to be more productive.
* Therefore, we assume
t^ = t^(S), t^ < 0 (7)
and
W = W(S), W > 0 (8)
Writing out this simple problem in full, the Lagrangean Function L is
L- U[Z(t^,X)] + (t - - t^ - t^[S(t^,y ]') W[SCtg.L^]
+ V- PX-PL
X s s (9)
9UThis yields iiirst order conditions (where U =-r—, etc.)
Z dt
U - W = 0 (10)
z tc ^ '
U Z - P = 0 (11)
z X X
- W + t W'S - t' WS =0 (12)
w ts 1 ts ^ ,
- P + t W'S, - t* WS, = 0 (13)
s w Is 1 Is
tW + V- PX-PL =0, (14)
:w X s s ' ^
where primes indicate derivatives.
Equations (12) and (13) show that the marginal product of own time and
labor services in producing the producer's good, multiplied by the sim of the
marginal contributions to the constraints (t W* - tiW > 0) is equal to the price
of each input. Furthermore, the ratio of the marginal products is equal to the
ratio of input prices:
(15)
Conditions (12) and (13) imply diminishing marginal effects of own time
2
and the labor service on earnings . They implicitly define optimal values of
3
these variables t* and L* which maximize Income . Income is then
s s
tW*+V=PX+PL* (16)
w X s s
where asterisked variables Indicate optimal levels. Utility is then maximized
subject to (16), where t = t - t - (t* + t?), so that t and t exhaust^ c^sl' w c
remaining time, t - (t* + t^).
s X
The usefulness of this analysis hinges on the possibility of examining the
effect of shift variables on factor use, particularly of L . In addition,
s
examination of the model's structure Indicates forces which Influence the elas
ticity of derived demand for L^. The latter analysis will prove useful in
Investigating market equilibrium.
4
We examine first shifts in the wage schedule. The relative demand
2Denoting the value of own time's marginal product as = (t^W
M < W'S , so that marginal costs rise more rapidly than marginal benefits.
csus cs
This is guaranteed for M < 0. A similar condition pertains to L , so that
t s ts s
M- = (t W* - t'W)S- declines, or M, . < 0. These conditions follow from
±s w 1 Is Isls
(unconstrained) maximization of the constraint. The remaining second order
condition is (M^ ~ *. ) • _ - M >0.
tsts tsts Isls tsls
3
Consequently, the pure loss of time is defined, since t- = t_[S(t , L )],
and also W, since W= W[S(t ,L )]. 1 1 s s
S 6
4
Effects follow from differentiation of (12) and (13), first order conditions
for maximization of the constraint, and from differentiation of the production
function for S, This yields
s^'tsts dW s^lsts dW ^ts dW ^
„ g .dt^ li. -p C 1 c „ rt
s Ists dW s Isls dW ^Is dW "
c Its dls dS dH dS Es
tsdW Is dW ~ dn dW ~ dn W '
where n is the marginal cost of S, Eg = t„W' - t^W is its marginal benefit, and the
demand function for S is a function of the difference between marginal costs and
marginal benefits: S = f( II - Es). The third equation represents demand and supply
equilibrium. Manipulation of these equations using the first order condltons and
the definition of the elasticity of substitution (a) for CRS production functions,
and their solution, yields the results in the text.
The analysis here owes much to Grossman (1972, pp. 90-92). Main differences
are the additional effect on wages directly, and the static interpretation which
demand for S as a function of the absolute difference in costs and returns.
equation for is
^Isw
where ct is the share of own time in the cost of production of s, a is the
elasticity of substitution, and n is the elasticity of demand for s, positively
signed. The output effect is positive, because even though marginal costs shift
upward by a, the share of labor in costs, marginal benefits shift upward by
a factor of unity.^ Therefore a rise in the wage rates of working individuals
raises the amount of labor service demanded. The effect is greater, the greater
are the substitution ^d output elasticities. The equation for own demand
elasticity defined negatively is
'lisps = - - (1 - «)n. (18)
Therefore, (17) and (18) imply equal but opposite own and cross-price
effects on L^. It can easily be shown that the effect of education, if it
acts like a neutral technological improvement, is to increase, leave unchanged,
or decrease the demand for the service of the output elasticity exceeded,
equalled, or were less than unity (see Michael (1972) for a proof). If education
also made own time relatively cheaper, or else increased substitutability between
own time and the labor service, it would exert an additional affect, decreasing
the demand for the labor service. Other environmental variables other than
education (such as an endowed stock of productive capacity) could also prove to
be important, and some of these might cause the price of S to rise. In that case
the above analysis for education would be reversed; demand for inputs such as L
would rise if demand for S were ineilastic, and so forth.
This result assumes that the marginal wage, W* — shifts upward by the
Qd
same percentage as the wage Itself, thus preserving the elasticity of the wage
schedule. Other cases could easily be handled using this framework.
To summarize, the productive model with no quality variation predicts that
persons with higher wage rates demand more of the labor service, persons whose
demand for output S is inelastic demand less of the labor service the higher
their education, and more the lower are endowed stocks of productive capacity.
These effects are independent of income per se; converse results occur when
demand for S is elastic. Therefore suppliers sort themselves to buyers according
to the characteristics mentioned, and not according to property income, for
example. The larger demanders tend to be persons with higher wage rates.
The pattern of sorting would be modified by the pattern of price discrimina
tion in monopolized markets for L , if larger demanders faced higher prices. In
8
the literature on price discrimination, factors which have been mentioned as
playing an important role are income, the wage rate, and the method of fee
payment. The first factor serves no role in this analysis; the second would
be relevant if higher wage persons had more or less inelastic demands; and the
third would be a possibility if different demanders paid their fees in different
ways. The effect of higher wages on the own demand elasticity would be to
reduce the demand elasticity if substitution possibilities were limited. In
the case of fixed proportions and constant demand elasticity,
, 0 (19)3W 3W 3W ^
since ~ j) >0 if 0<1,^ Hence the elasticity moves towards zero,
s s
In a more general case with constant elasticities,
9n.
Isps . . 9a
3W 3W
E(6 f—P T T
Where E e din, E s s , . s , < . < .
u~ "tj = 1 + —~— = 1 - a > .0 as CT > 1.E(/) E(f) E(f) '
s s s
In this case, ^^sps more negative-if Ti<a<lorifl<cr<:n«
* It moves toward zero if a < n < 1 or if 1 < ri < a. Therefore, higher wage
persons iii this case have more inelastic demands when the output elasticity lies
between unity and the elasticity of substitution.^
An additional influence on the elasticity it has been claimed [see
Fuchs, 1972, pp..43-44], is the method by which purchases of L are financed. For
8
example, use of Insurance with imperfect experience rating may result in only a
fraction of the price being imposed on the consumer; or else a program of sub
sidies might create the same effect. However, a difference between the market
price of L and the price charged to the consumer is not a sufficient condition
s
to affect the demand elasticity. To see this, let P* be the price charged to
8
consumers and P be the market price, and let the two be related by a constant ^
s
0 < 3 < 1. Then P* « $P < P , and the relation between the observed elasticity
^Isps' elasticity is =TT It =fI ^ iT =
•^s ss ss ss*^
Therefore, whether or not consumers pay the fractional price does not affect the
demand elasticity. In order for a reduction in the elasticity to take place, the
average effect on price must be less than the marginal effect, so that consumers*
8price falls in relation to the market price. One payment scheme referred to in
the literature assumes a lump-sum payment followed a constant fraction of total
fees for an unlimited amount of service. This scheme would fulfill the conditions
In the case of non-constant elasticities, of course, additional terms would
have to be considered. The expression becomes
9n
~TW 8W 9W ' 9W= (n - O) Is - Is + (20')
g
Let P* = f(Pg) be the relation between the two prices. Then
P* 9, P* 9- P* 9, P
, _ s ^ s Is P* s Is sf
^I'sps I f 9P Isf 9P* p " Is aP* f
spg s s s s
< pf* < p£*
^Isps ^ ^Isps ^ ^ the marginal consumer's price falls
relative to the market price with aft increase in the latter.
for a reduction in the elasticity of demand: therefore, even if consumer's
' price elasticities were identical, so that the term were identical across
persons, would be lower for insured than uninsured consumers.
B. A Mixed Producer's and Consumer's Good
Now introduce utility bearing characteristics of the commodity S, and .
indirectly of the inputs t and L . The model then becomes (assuming it is
s s
time lost which enters the utility function), max
U= U{Z(t^,X), tj^[S(tg,L^]} (21)
subject to the constraints (2) and (3). Of the first order conditions, only
those pertaining to own time and the labor service are explicitly altered;
= ° (22)
(23)
The new conditions state that value of marginal product is less than price,
due to the utility yield (U^. tj^ > 0, since time lost is a bad, or
^ 9
time loss is reduced, t< 0). Since equation (21) assumes a separable form,
the demand functions for inputs depend only on the prices of cooperative inputs
and the level of the commodity which they produce [see Strotz (1957, 1959),
Gorman (1959)]. The effect of a rise in the consumer's wage is, in elasticity form,
n a 0
S S 8
n, rr = a a(0- + 0^ - 1) + n (—•„ ;:—) + T] aIsW s Is/W ts/W ss IIq - 0 sz z (24)
o S
^t "s°^s - ®s 10
^sF^ Wt +V~ "^s ^ n 0 ^ ~ ^s^
s - s
Where a and a the shares of own time in the cost of production of s and z, 0-
s z xs
9
Clearly S is no longer produced at a level which will maximize the con
sumer's wealth..
^^The derivation of the equation is contained in the Appendix.
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0 are value of marginal products of L and t respectively, ti and n are
tS j S S 8S 3Z
compensated own and cross elasticities of demand for S, II is the (gross) marginal
s
cost of proudcing S, 0 is the marginal benefit, and II - 0 is the (net) marginal
s
cost.
Finally, n « is the wealth elasticity of demand for S, and y » 1 " Y
Sf 3 S
shares of S and Z in expenditures valued at marginal cost. In the mixed model, it
is no longer certain that higher wages increase demand for the labor service.
The term ^for substitution in production [a^a + ®ts/W positive
by the first order conditions (since 0- , + 0 . - 1 > 0), but the (net)
® n a ' 0
s s ^ smarginal cost of S may have increased J-if —^— > 0 or a > ®^s/n ^
s - s ® s
that output of S may decrease at constant utility, leading to a decrease in L
8
n a 0 n a 0 TT
SS^S SS~S JLXdemanded [ri (—= ) < 0 if =— > 0], Because S and t are gross
ss u 0 n 0
s - s s s
substitutes, > 0. The final wealth term is again ambiguous, since wealth
' ^ Wrises by the share of earnings in all wealth, — , while the rise in (net) costs of
t+V n a _ 0
the goods, weighted by their share in expenditures is [y ( ^) + (1 - y )a_].
S Ji 0 s /t
8-3
Sufficient conditions for to rise with the wage - for Ti-^gy to be positive - are
that the net marginal cost fall, so that a < 0 /II , and the net effect on wealth
TT TT n ^ ^ ^n a 0
t s s ^ sbe positive, so that ~ ^) > (1 - Yg) Expressed somewhat
s - s
differently, the share of own time in the cost of production of S, and the share of
Z in the budget must both be "small", in the sense defined above.
The own elasticity of demand is
'^ IsPs = " V + ("ss " • (")
^^The condition for S (and L„) to incriease at constant utility is a <0 /JI ,
s s s' s'
or that the ratio of marginal benefits to marginal cost exceed the share of wages
in coats. If this is the case, since E0/EW = 1 (see the Appendix), the %increase
in wages raises marginal benefits to a greater extent than marginal costs.
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Again with an eye to studying opportunities for price discrimination, this
elasticity would be less in absolute value, the smaller the elasticity of
substitution in production, the smaller the compensated substitution term for S,
the smaller the share of S in the consumer's (implicit) budget, and the smaller
the wealth elasticity. In a constant elasticity case, n soiild be smaller
XSa s
12in absolute value the larger is wealth (the wage rate held constant) if ri _ < 1.
In this model increases in property can affect the elasticity, and also the level
of demand for the service. Hence, so long as S is a normal good, the mixed
model predicts a positive effect on the level of X of assets of the consumer: the
s
pure production model predicts a zero effect.
Define - YgHgp > the uncompensated elasticity of demand for S.
Then = - ot^a - (1 - a^) n^, and if a and were approximately constant,
^^IsPs
(26)
For this, special cdse, the same analysis pertains (as on pp. 7-8) of the
effect of a wage increase on the elasticity, ^j^gpg becomes more inelastic with
a higher wage if ri < a < 1, or 1 < a < ri , and more elastic: if 1 < n <0* or
s s • s
0 Hg < 1. We cannot say in this case whether higher wage persons have more
inelastic demands, even if we know a lies between 1, and ri , because a rise in the
s
wage need not Indicate a larger purchase [see the discussion of equation (24)].
Once again, if a payment system were introduced which charged a declining
fraction of the price of a unit of L as L increased, demand for L would be more
s s s
inelastic for those included in the system than those not included.
The principal differences between the mixed and pure models, to summarize this
12- ^^IsPs , >
"F 3F ^sF^^sF ^ ^ ^sF ^ This assumes all
elasticities, a, rigg» and are constant.
12
discussion, are that in the mixed model, a rise in the wage need not increase
level of demand for the service, a rise in level of wealth, unaccompanied by a
rise in the wage, typically increases level of demand for the service, and
possible also its elasticity. In the pure producer's good model, a rise in the
wage must increase level of demand, and pure income effects play no role.
Conditions for price discrimination are correspondingly affected.
2. The Model With Quality Variation in A Single Dimension
Now introduce variation in quality of the labor service; better or worse
service is available at the appropriate price. This section adopts a modification
of the consumer's budget line introduced by Rosen (1974), which is itself an
adaptation of Houthakker's (1952) work oh quality variation. Let q be an
objective measure of the quality of L , and let the price of a unit of L depend
8 8
13on q in the relation P = P (q). The production of the commodity S is assumed
s s
to depend oh q as well as on own time t and the labor service L , so S = S(L ,q,t ),
S 8 ' S 8
where S is homogeneous of degree 1. Therefore we rewrite the budget
constraint with a variable price p , and an additional argument in the production
8
function for S. For simplicity neglect the role of S as a consumer good; then
the Lagrangean function is
L= U[Z(t^,S)] + A{(t - - tg - [S(tg, q. L^)]) W[S(tg. q, L^)] (27)
+ V - P^X - P^(])
Simplify momentarily by letting P„(q) = a • q. First order conditions for
s
wealth maximization are
(t^W - t| W)S^ - W= 0 (28)
.s
13A linear formulation would write p(q) - a • q. There is no reason to
expect linearity, unless arbitrage across qualities Is possible; but if these
services are tied bundles, only separable at a cost, resale activity does not
occur.
13
(t W t' W)S, - aq = 0 (29)
W XX'
8
(t W - t' W)S - a, = 0 "" (30)
w X q 1
^ s
Differentiation of these conditions and the production function - demand
14
function equilibrium condition yields the demand functions. The effect of
a change in the wage is
Til = 1 + (1 - ) Ti (31)Isw ts tsls ts \
where a is the share of ts in the cost of productuion of S, n is the
cs
elasticity of demand for S (defined positively), and (adjusted)
partial elasticity of substitution between own time and labor service of con
stant quality. The elasticity is adjusted by the presence of the price terms
if it is positive, and own time and the labor service are substitutes, persons
with higher wages demand more units of the labor service for any quality, and
the results of the previous section continue to apply. However, were the two
inputs complementary, the conclusion would no longer continue to hold.
Analysis of shift factors is also parallel to the previous section. The
wage elasticity of the quality of medical care is
V = "ts - "ts> (32)
14
The equation system obtained is
4. c ils . _ la- 1
8w n ®ts aw ^is 9W ^q sw " ^ w•
Ml+s 1^+Q
""ts 3W n ''tsts aw ^ ^tsis aw ^ts^ aw " n
c HL i: a. c 9tS . _ 91s , a^ ^ _
Is aw n ®tsis aw ®isis aw ^^is^ ~ aw " °
o M. ii a, c « 3tS , /-e 3.. . 31s , _ ^ _
q 3W H 3W 3W "*• ®qq 3W " °
The details of the manipulations are somewhat lengthy and are outlined in the
second section of the Appendix. This system:ls a generalization of the model
in section 2, fn. 4.
14
and analagous considerations apply: higher wage persons would clearly demand
higher quality services if the adjusted partial elasticity of substitution
between own time and quality of service were positive, but might not if the
two were complements. The"wage elasticity of the quality of the service would
exceed or be less than the quantity wage elasticity as a q > a - .
ts ^ tsls
Consider now the effect of a change in the common price parameter
pertaining both to L and q. Examination of the first order conditions shows
t ' O
that a change in a affects the price of both and q, and this is a feature of
quantity-quality models generally. The quantity elasticity of the service is
Because = 1 - and [see Allen
(1938), p. 502 for a proof] (33) can be further simplified to
'^ Isa = - «ts "ists - - «ts^ (33)'
Thus the effect of a rise in the common price parameter ^ is unambiguously
negative if L and t are substitutes; a perverse case ( n >0) might arise
~ (1-a ) isa
^Ists ® ^Ists " a analogous elasticity for q is
ts
\a = «q ( ''qq " + "is('is'' " ^34)
= - "ts "ts" - (34)'
thus raising the same issue about sign of the partial elasticity. If we make
the plausible assumptions that > 0 and. > 0, so that both the quantity
and quality of the service are substitutes for own time, both n, and n are
Isa qa
negative.
What factors might affect the own demand elasticity? Assuming constant
substitution and demand elasticities, the effect of a change In the wage Is
15
9 n, • . 3a
"Iw = ( "ists - ^ = ("ists - W "5)
"tsls + iT^ 'Therefore. 5 0 and the
ts ts:
demand elasticity decreases with the wage if a , > n and "a < 1
tsls ts
"^tsls ^ "^ts ^ analogous condition for n isqa
-n) (1 - (1 - ^ ^ (36)
allowing similar conclusions to be drawn. The discussidn concerning other factors
which affect the price elasticity is largely parallel to similar passages in the
preceding section: the pa3rment of fees through prepayed insurance will lower
price elasticity if the fraction of price imposed on the consumer declines as
the price increases, and so on. Changes in income with no rise in the wage have
no effect either on the level or elasticity of demand.
The main differences between the present model and the earlier one consist
in the replacement of the elasticity of substitution with partial elasticities,
and the possibility of complementarity among the purchased inputs in quality and
quantity. Furthermore, the interactive relation in the budget between quality and
quantity Implies cross-effects on the quantity and quality of the service which can
result in a rise In the demand for each under unusual circumstances, since the
price of the other input also is rising. The model can be generalized slightly
to allow for non-linearity of the joint price. Instead of Pg(q) =aq, simply
write PgCq), where P;(q) > 0, and P^(q) > 0. This affects the second-order
^^Differentiate oc^^, remembering that =" f and ts/S does not
depend on the level of output S for a CRS production function.
16
conditions in a trivial fashion.
Finally, since firms also will differ in the quality of labor services they
supply, quality sorting - matching of buyers and sellers in the quality dimension -
also will emerge. The intensive margins in this case» which apply to an individual
buyer, are two. The quality margin determines the choice of firm, or supplier
of the service, since firms operate aloiig a quality spectrum. The quantity margin
determines what fraction of its resources a firm allots to a demander.
The fact that quality can vary implies that identification of price of the
service is a problem. Given a quality index, separation of price from quality
might proceed as follows. Regress the observed price of the service on the quality
index; and then calculate residuals of the difference in observed and predicted
prices. The difference represents an estimate of price variation among demanders,
and can be related to factors which have been mentioned as possible causes of
discrimination in a secondary regression. This then would estimate the importance
and direction of these factors in price discrimination.
4. Generalization to N Quality Dimensions,
Continue to utilize the pure production model, but now allow for N distinct
characteristics (quality dimensions) of the service. Write P^(q^, q^-..,
3P_ 3Pwhere 3 is a shift variable,— >0, and |^ 0, necessarily.
First-order conditions of the model in section 3 with P rewritten according
to the above, are
Ct^W - tj:w)S^^ - W- 0 (37)
(t W - t:w)S- - P == 0
w 1 Is s
3P- tiW)S - ^ L3 - 0.
i - 1, 2, N.
Therefore, all previous manipulations would continue to hold, except that
17
now there N + 2 cross-partial elasticities of substitution, and in an analysis
% of the effect of exogenous shifts in 3, there are N - 1 interactive terms to
consider, instead of 1, as in the preceding section. Otherwise nothing signi
ficant in the model is changed.
5. Applications of the Theory.
In this section we consider two potential applications of the approach.
The markets for services of lawyers and physicians exemplify the necessary con
ditions for its relevance, since the service is combined with characteristics
of clients, to produce an outcome which is in each case beneficial to them.
Each market is characterized by tying of the service to buyers, the consequence
being impossibility of resale, which given a degree of monopolization implies the
likelihood of price discrimination. These markets also exhibit considerable
variation in quality of service, so that the price identification problem, and
the quantity-quality tradeoff are important to explicitly consider.
There is some reason to suppose that the specification of marginal benefits
is correct for these applications. Healthier persons are more productive and
earn higher wages than less healthy ones; therefore it is only necessary to
establish a positive link between health and medical care to show S W* > 0,
Is
since W* > 0. Clearly the same reasoning applies to days lost: healthier '
persons lose less time, so t' < 0, and it only remains to show S, > 0.^^
1 Is
Lawyers too, by decreasing prison sentences of their clients reduce days
lost, or increase "free" days (see Landes, 1973 for a discussion). Furthermore,
It must be remembered that the second-order conditions contain terms in
in this general case.
Fucb.s (1972) stresses a small but significantly positive effect of L .
s
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embodied labor services of buyers has been explored. Such markets are prone
to price discrimination. Conditions for level and elasticity of quantity and
quality of demand received the most emphasis. Empirically the main .contribution
is to suggest directions of price discrimination by buyers and a method for
separation of quality from price variation of the labor service.
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